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Abstract 
Researchers since Inhelder and Piaget (1964) have replicated a curious finding. When using a 
picture-verification task (e.g., a picture of four elephants, three of them being ridden by 
boys), children have been shown to supply a non-adult answer in response to a question such 
as ‘Is every boy riding an elephant?’, e.g. ‘no, not that one’ (pointing to the extra elephant). 
The question we will address here is whether or not this response by children reflects a non-
adult linguistic semantic representation of the meaning of the universal quantifier. Non-adult 
accounts of children’s interpretation of the universal quantifier (‘every’) suggest that children 
answer ‘no’ to questions like ‘Is every boy riding an elephant?’ because they may not 
initially interpret the subject set of ‘boys’ as the restrictor of every. By contrast, adult-like 
accounts of children’s interpretation of every maintain that children do correctly interpret the 
set of ‘boys’ as the restrictor of every in such sentences, suggesting that children’s non-adult 
responses can be eliminated by satisfying contextual demands on the use of the universal 
quantifier. In this paper, we present longitudinal data from 4 two-year-old children, children 
far younger than have previously been studied experimentally. We show that even from the 
earliest stages of language acquisition, so long as sentences are presented in felicitous 
discourse contexts, children’s interpretation of universal quantification appears adult-like. 
The data therefore support the adult-like accounts of children’s acquisition of universal 
quantification. 
 
1. Introduction 
Young children's interpretation of the universal quantifier (e.g., every in English) has been 
the subject of much debate over the last 40 years. In 1964, Inhelder and Piaget reported a 
study of French-speaking children around age 5, who were presented with a display of blue 
circles, blue squares and red squares, and asked ‘Are all the circles blue?’. In response, 
children often produced non-adult answers like ‘No, there were circles and squares [blue]’ 
(1964: 61). Researchers have replicated this finding in several different languages, using 
picture-verification tasks such as that in Figure 1 (e.g. Donaldson & Lloyd 1974; Philip 1995, 
1996; Crain et al. 1996; Drozd & van Loosbroek 1999, 2006; Philip & Lynch 2000).  
 
Test question:  
Here are some boys and some elephants.  
Is every boy riding an elephant? 
 
Child response:  
No, not that one  
[pointing to the extra elephant] 
  
 
Figure 1: Children's Non-Adult Response in a Picture Verification Task  
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Children's negative responses illustrated in Figure 1 have been called ‘symmetrical 
responses’ or ‘over-exhaustive search errors’ because children seem to require a one-to-one 
correspondence between elements of the set denoted by the subject phrase (boys) and the set 
denoted by the object phrase (elephants). The question we will address here is whether or not 
this response by children reflects a non-adult linguistic semantic representation of the 
meaning of the universal quantifier. 
 
First it will be useful to explicate the syntax and semantics of universal quantification in 
human languages, using English every as an example. In adult English, every is a Determiner 
in the syntax. In the semantics, it defines a two-place relation between its restrictor (in the 
case above, the subject noun phrase) and its nuclear scope (the predicate phrase). The 
quantificational phrase, every boy, is said to ‘live on’ the set denoted by the restrictor, boy, in 
the sense that it is valid to infer from the statement ‘Every boy is riding an elephant’ to the 
statement ‘Every boy is a boy who is riding an elephant’ (Barwise & Cooper 1981). In the 
conversational context, there is a simple test of the 'lives on' relation. This relation holds if 
the truth or falsity of ‘Every boy is riding an elephant’ can be established by checking the 
intersection of the set of boys and the set of boys riding elephants to see whether every boy is 
in the intersection of these two sets. Crucially, the entire set of elephants may not need to be 
checked. As long as every boy is riding an elephant, there can be elephants 'left over', i.e., 
ones not being ridden by boys. Unlike adults, children who produce the 'symmetrical 
response' reject the sentence ‘Every boy is riding an elephant’ if there are 'extra' elephants.  
 
There are two basic types of proposal about these non-adult responses by children. On one, 
these responses occur because children pass through a stage when, in addition to an adult-like 
linguistic analysis, children assign a non-adult analysis to sentences with the universal 
quantifier. The non-adult analysis requires children to check the entire set denoted by the 
object NP in assessing the truth or falsity of these sentences (Philip 1995; Geurts 2003). We 
call such proposals non-adult accounts. Another kind of proposal is that children have adult-
like knowledge of the semantics of the universal quantifier, but they have difficulty 
interpreting every when it is used in infelicitous discourse contexts (Crain et al. 1996; Drozd 
& van Loosbroek 1999, 2006). We call these proposals adult-like accounts. To contribute to 
this debate, we present findings from an experimental investigation conducted with children 
who were far younger than those tested before. Our aim in conducting this study was to 
uncover children’s earliest hypotheses about the syntax and semantics of universal 
quantification. If children entertain a non-adult linguistic representation of universal 
quantification at some point during language development, it would presumably be most 
likely to occur at an early stage of development. However, the data from the study we 
conducted show that even 2-year-old children respond in an adult-like manner to sentences 
with the universal quantifier, at least when these sentences are presented in felicitous 
discourse contexts. The data therefore support the adult-like accounts of children’s 
acquisition of universal quantification.  
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2. Possible Child Hypotheses about Universal Quantification 
2.1. Non-adult Accounts 
One non-adult account is by Philip (1995). We call this the Event Quantification Account. 
This account suggests that children interpret universal quantifiers as quantifying over events 
rather than individuals, similar to quantificational adverbs. On this account, the non-adult 
analysis children assign to the sentence Every boy is riding an elephant puts a disjunction of 
events in the restrictor of every, along the lines of (1), where 'e' is a variable ranging over 
events.  
 
(1) Every(e) [Boy(e) or Elephant(e)] [is a Boy-riding-an-Elephant(e)] 
‘For every event e in which a boy participates or in which an elephant participates (or 
both), a boy is riding an elephant in e.’ 
  
The Event Quantification Account has two shortcomings. First, it attributes to children a 
reading of the universal quantifier which violates the ‘lives on’ relation of determiner 
meanings proposed by Barwise and Cooper (1981). No determiner in adult languages violates 
this relation, so the proposal that the determiner every does not adhere to this relation for 
children is a threat to the continuity assumption -- the proposal that children's linguistic 
analyses are restricted to ones that characterize adult languages (e.g., Crain 1991; Pinker 
1984). Second, the account faces a learnability problem. To account for the fact that children 
who produce non-adult responses are also capable of giving adult-like answers in situations 
like the one depicted in Figure 1, Philip assumes that children have both an adult-like reading 
and an event quantificational reading available to them. This is problematic, given that adults 
also accept a symmetrical response in situations where the subject and object set are in a one-
to-one relation. The problem is how children can expunge the non-adult reading from their 
grammars. Without overt negative evidence, in order to expunge the non-adult linguistic 
analysis children would need to keep a mental record of the absence of certain adult 
responses to every. For example, children would need to note that adults do not reject 
sentences like ‘Every boy is riding an elephant’ in situations like Figure 1 where there is no 
one-to-one correspondence between boys and elephants. Unless children are excellent record 
keepers, it is unclear how they could ever ‘unlearn’ their non-adult analysis. 
 
Another non-adult account is the Weak Mapping account advanced by Geurts (2003). To 
explain children's non-adult responses to universally quantified sentences, Geurts draws on 
the distinction between strong and weak quantifiers. He argues that the semantic 
representation of weak quantifiers is less complex than that of strong quantifiers and that 
children adopt a weak quantifier syntax-semantics mapping rule, in order to ease the 
demands on their working memory and attention. To understand the proposal, it is worth 
noting first that weak quantifiers like some are intersective. To verify the sentence ‘Some 
boys are riding an elephant’ one only needs to check the intersection of the set of boys and 
the set of elephants, to see whether or not something is in the intersection. Strong quantifiers, 
on the other hand, are relational. To verify the strong quantificational expression, every, one 
has to check both the set of boys and the set of boys riding elephants and verify whether or 
not every boy is in the intersection. Geurts suggests that children have an adult-like 
underlying semantic representation for every, and children know that every is a strong 
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quantifier. However, he contends that the domain of quantification (the restrictor) is 
syntactically underdetermined for children. This leaves room for contextual factors to 
influence the child to adopt a syntax-semantics mapping rule that is appropriate for weak 
quantifiers, which is cognitively simpler than the syntax-semantics mapping rule for strong 
quantifiers. In Geurts’ view, the weak quantifier syntax-semantics mapping rule allows 
material from the nuclear scope of the quantifier to determine the domain of quantification. 
For example, in a sentence like ‘Most people visit Berlin in the spring’, it is suggested that 
the domain of quantification for the quantifier most is restricted, not just by the subject NP 
people, but by the backgrounded material in the VP visit Berlin. The quantifier is thus 
evaluated against a domain of quantification that is defined contextually, so the restrictor of 
most is understood to be ‘people who visit Berlin’. Geurts’ suggests that, in a similar fashion, 
children can be led to contextually determine the domain of quantification of a strong 
quantifier like every, so that the content of the restrictor will include whatever entities are 
most salient to the child at the time. In cases like Figure 1 above, the extra elephant makes 
the set denoted by the object NP highly salient, so this set can sometimes enter into the 
restrictor for children. In contexts where the elephants are highly salient, therefore, children 
tend to consider the set of elephants as the restrictor of the universal quantifier.  
 
Geurts’ account avoids the problem of violating the 'lives on' relation associated with 
determiner meanings, by only allowing a single set, the most salient one, to be interpreted as 
the restrictor of every, however his account faces other questions. In addition to the inherent 
problem of deciding when a set of objects is salient for children, it is not clear whether the 
difference in processing complexity between weak and strong quantifiers would be enough to 
push children to use weak quantifier syntax-semantics mapping rules with every, especially 
given there is independent evidence that 3–5-year-old children know that every is a strong 
determiner, in the sense that it shares certain semantic properties with the strong determiner 
the (Meroni, Gualmini, & Crain 2007). The Weak Mapping account must also explain how 
children eventually converge on a completely adult-like grammar. Geurts’ answer to this is 
that, because children are assumed to have the correct underlying relational semantic 
representation for every, there is nothing to ‘learn’ or ‘unlearn’. As children’s working 
memory capacity and attention increase (with maturation), they will achieve the processing 
resources necessary to begin using the strong quantifier syntax-semantics mapping rules that 
go along with the semantic representation they already have (in which the domain of 
quantification is strictly limited to the syntactic restrictor). This explanation, however, 
depends on the assumption that children have less working memory capacity than adults. 
And, again, the experimental finding that children interpret every as a strong determiner casts 
doubt on an account of children’s non-adult responses based on limitations in working 
memory capacity (Meroni et al. 2007). 
2.2. Adult-Like Accounts 
In contrast to non-adult accounts, other researchers have concluded that children’s 
interpretation of ‘every’ is essentially adult-like. Using picture-verification tasks, Sugisaki 
and Isobe (2001) found that 4- and 5-year-old children’s performance is greatly improved 
when there are several extra objects in the context. For others, over-exhaustive search errors 
are seen as an experimental artifact, resulting from infelicitous test conditions. For Crain and 
colleagues, who support the Full Competence account, the infelicity stems from the fact that 
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when asking someone to judge the truth or falsity of a sentence, a different possible outcome 
from the actual outcome should have been under consideration at some point. A felicitous 
context for the question ‘Is every boy riding an elephant?’ requires that, at some point, the 
possibility exists that not every boy will be riding an elephant. To satisfy this requirement, at 
least one of the boys might consider riding something else, a donkey say. This is called the 
‘condition of plausible dissent’. In the case of Figure 1, where the answer to the question has 
never been in doubt, children might infer that a different question is intended, a question 
about the presence of the ‘extra’ elephant. Crain et. al suggest that, while adults and older 
children can accommodate infelicity of this type, younger children cannot. Children's non-
adult response, therefore, are due to children's failure to accommodate an unsatisfied felicity 
condition, one which adults can accommodate.  
 
Interestingly, it has been shown that although adults do not make errors on trials like Figure 
1, they are sensitive to the infelicity of the task. Eye-tracking results show that adults fixate 
significantly longer on the extra elephant in trials like Figure 1, as compared to pictures 
which depict both an extra elephant and some other animal that the boys might have ridden 
(Meroni, Crain, & Gualmini 2001). Moreover, if pragmatic felicity is deliberately sabotaged, 
so that the wrong set is established as the topic of discourse, adults too show breakdowns in 
accessing the correct meaning of every, committing errors similar to children, though to a 
lesser extent (Philip & Lynch 2000). Adults also commit errors if the ‘extra’ object is part of 
a natural pairing of objects such as saucers and tea cups (Freeman, Sinha, & Stedmon 1982).  
 
In further support of their account of children's non-adult responses, Crain and colleagues 
tested 34 3–5-year-old children using trials like that in Figure 1. They found non-adult 
responses occurred 35% of the time, and the non-adult responses were concentrated in a 
group of 14 children who produced errors 82% of the time. These 14 children were then 
tested using test trials similar to Figure 1, but in contexts that satisfied the condition of 
plausible dissent. Twelve of the 14 children no longer made a single symmetrical response. 
Two children still rejected the target sentences, but their justifications showed that their 
rejections were not due to the extra objects in the story. Rather, they prohibited the use of 
every to refer to a set of only 3 members. These 2 children were retested with stories in which 
5 characters made up the quantified NP set, and they accepted the test sentences (Crain et al. 
1996).  
 
Other adult-like accounts include Drozd & van Loosbroek’s Presuppositionality Account 
(1999, 2006) and Philip’s Relevance Account (2004). Both propose that children correctly 
represent the set of boys as the restrictor of the universal quantifier. Children's non-adult 
responses are hypothesized to arise in contexts like Figure 1 because one of the 
presuppositions associated with the universal quantifier has not been satisfied. Strong 
quantifiers like every carry a presupposition of existence about the speaker’s intended 
domain of quantification. In tasks like Figure 1 the set of visible boys is intended as the 
domain of quantification. However, given the minimal discourse context of such tasks, 
children may not always take this set to be presupposed. Rather, children may use other 
aspects of the context (in this case the extra elephant) to determine the set of boys that are 
being referred to. Philip (2004) suggests that children do this because they may lack 
knowledge of a pragmatic rule restricting verification to visible objects in the context.  
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All of these adult-like accounts concur that children correctly interpret the set of boys as the 
restrictor of every in cases like Figure 1 under normal discourse circumstances (when the 
object set has not been deliberately established as the discourse topic). All these accounts 
also agree that errors can be minimised by presenting children with a richer context. The 
accounts differ in what aspects of the context have to be manipulated to prevent symmetrical 
responses. Sugisaki & Iobe (2001) suggest that providing a large set of extra objects is 
sufficient to improve child performance on tasks like that in Figure 1. Drozd & van 
Loosbroek (2006) maintain that satisfying the presuppositionality demands of the universal 
quantifier, by making the set corresponding to the restrictor clear in the context, is a 
sufficient condition to reduce children’s error rates. They point to data showing no significant 
difference in 4–5-year-old Dutch-speaking children’s performance on test trials like Figure 1 
in which only the presuppositionality demands of the context were met, as compared to trials 
in which both the presuppositionality demands and the condition of plausible dissent were 
met. Nonetheless, although not statistically significant, their results clearly show that 
children’s performance on trials in which the condition of plausible dissent was also met was 
better than in trials in which it was not (see Crain (2000) for a critique of Drozd & van 
Loosbroek’s analysis of their 1999 results). Drozd & van Loosbroek (2006) admit this aspect 
of their results remains to be explained. 
 
This study does not address the issue of which particular contextual conditions are sufficient 
to obtain adult-like responses from children. Instead, we present data from younger children 
than have ever been reported in the experimental literature on this topic. These data support 
the emerging consensus that children’s interpretation of the set relation of every is essentially 
adult-like from the earliest stages of language development.  
3. The Experiment 
In this section we describe the subjects and design of our study. We then outline the scoring 
system and review the predictions of the two types of account: non-adult and adult-like. 
3.1. Subjects 
Four English-speaking children attended our lab for fortnightly 1-hour experimental play 
sessions over a period of 6–12 months. Each child’s alias, age and number of experimental 
sessions are shown in Table 1, below. 
Table 1. Child subject information 
Child Alias Age Number of sessions 
Ruby 1;11–2;5 13 
Ian 2;4–3;1 15 
Pam 2;1–2;11 21 
Liv 2;4–3;0 18 
3.2. Tasks and context 
We employed two experimental tasks: an act-out and a judgement task. The children were 
first introduced to different sets of toys making up sets of subjects (e.g., mermaids, turtles) 
and objects (e.g., strawberries, blankets) in transitive sentences. Both subject and object sets 
could vary in number from trial to trial, but each set contained at least three members (and 
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usually more) so that all contexts favoured a distributive universal wide-scope reading. On an 
act-out trial, children were instructed to distribute the object set in relation to the subject set. 
A representative example is given in (2). Act-out trials were often, but not always, followed 
by a judgement trial as in (3). At other times, judgement trials were given independently, in 
reference to arrays set up by the experimenter in the course of play.  
 
(2) Give every mermaid a strawberry.  
(3) Does every mermaid have a strawberry? 
 
For very young children, act-out tasks were easier than judgement tasks. This is because the 
act-out task doesn’t place any verbal demands on the child, while all judgement tasks 
minimally require a yes/no answer.  
 
Because the tasks were naturalistic, presented in the course of a continuous play discourse 
with the child, they naturally fulfilled both the presuppositionality demands of every and the 
condition of plausible dissent. By being introduced to real sets of toys, the presuppositional 
domain of quantification was made clear to children. By being asked to manipulate the toys 
themselves or by seeing them manipulated in front of them as a task unfolded, many possible 
outcomes besides the final one were available. We made no special effort to manipulate the 
saliency of the subject or objects sets or otherwise define the context, although it could 
perhaps be argued that the object sets were always more salient for children, being the items 
they were asked to distribute themselves.  
3.3. Conditions 
There were three conditions which differed in the number of subjects and objects in the 
experimental play space:   
 
Equal  (where number of mermaids = number of strawberries) 
Less  (fewer strawberries than mermaids)  
More  (more strawberries than mermaids) 
 
The More condition was intended to resemble trials like that in Figure 1 where the presence 
of extra objects might result in a non-adult response from the children. The Less condition 
was included as a control for the crucial More condition (children who appear to be adult-like 
by answering ‘yes’ to More judgement trials should answer ‘no’ to Less judgement trials). 
The Equal condition was included in case any child only allowed a symmetrical reading of 
every.  
 
In both task types, trials in the Less condition were easily the most demanding. To succeed 
on an act-out Less trial, a child had to indicate to the experimenter that the task (e.g. ‘Give 
every mermaid a strawberry’) could not be completed because there weren’t enough 
strawberries. Similarly, in a judgement Less trial (e.g. ‘Does every mermaid have a 
strawberry?’), the correct answer was always ‘no’. This is a difficult answer to give for very 
young children, who tend to say ‘yes’ when they are uncertain (even if in some cases they 
can demonstrate the correct answer to the question in other ways) (Crain & Thornton 1998). 
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3.4. Scoring 
The play sessions were video recorded and transcribed in full. The relevant trials were then 
isolated for scoring. Trials that were poorly set-up or where the experimenter interfered with 
the course of the trial were discarded. For each trial, the child’s first response was recorded, 
as well as any subsequent response or justification for their response that they may have 
given. Trials in which the child’s first response was adult-like (and any subsequent response 
matched their first response) were scored as ‘Right’. Trials in which the child’s first response 
was non-adult (and any subsequent response was also non-adult) were scored as ‘Wrong’. 
Trials in which the child’s first and subsequent responses differed were scored as 
‘Mismatch’. In 6 out of 7 ‘Mismatch’ responses across all data sets, the first response was 
non-adult, but the subsequent response showed adult-like comprehension. These 6 trials were 
not counted as correct, but added to the final category ‘Other’, containing trials in which the 
child was distracted by another toy or not paying attention, and therefore gave no response or 
a response not related to the test trial. The 7th mismatch trial consisted in an unintelligible 
response by the child followed by an adult-like response to a follow-up question. This trial 
was counted as ‘Right’. 
 
Between 20-30% of each child’s data set was selected at random to be scored by a second 
coder (Ruby: 13 trials, Ian: 11 trials, Pam: 24 trials, Liv: 15 trials). Overall inter-rater 
reliability was high (0.83). Cases in which there was disagreement were discussed with a 
third coder and a consensus reached. Table 2, below, shows the number of discarded trials 
and breakdown of scored trials for each subject. 
Table 2. All subjects’ discarded and scored trials 
Subject Discarded 
trials 
Scored  
Act-out trials 
Scored  
Judgement trials 
Total  
Scored trials 
Ruby 9 22 26 48 
Ian 12 17 24 41 
Pam 20 30 42 72 
Liv  11 18 27 45 
3.5. Predictions 
The two types of account (non-adult and adult-like) of children’s interpretation of every make 
different predictions about their responses to trials in the More condition (the condition in 
which there were more objects than subjects in the experimental play space). 
On Philip’s EQA, children require every element of the subject set and every element of the 
object set to be involved in the event in question. On Geurts’ Weak Mapping Account, 
children quantify over elements in the object set if this set is salient. Set salience is a vague 
notion, but as noted above, the object set would arguably be the more salient set as this set 
was physically controlled by the child and it contained extra members in relation to the 
subject set. So, on these non-adult accounts in a More act-out task (e.g., (2) ‘Give every 
mermaid a strawberry’), we could expect to see children distribute all the strawberries, either 
by sharing them out to the mermaids present, or (perhaps preferably for a one-to-one 
mapping) by searching for extra mermaids to receive the extra strawberries. In a judgement 
task (e.g., (3) ‘Does every mermaid have a strawberry?’), we could expect children to reject 
arrays in which every mermaid has a strawberry, but in which extra strawberries are present.  
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Adult-like accounts do not predict any difficulty for children in the More condition if task 
felicity demands are met. To minimally complete the act-out task in (2), children must 
distribute as many strawberries as there are mermaids. Extra strawberries should be 
irrelevant. However, it is not incorrect on adult-like accounts for the child to distribute all the 
elements of the object set to the subjects present. What is not predicted is that children will 
search for extra members of the subject set in order to distribute the extra objects. Similarly, 
in a judgement task such as (3), it is not predicted that children will reject arrays in which 
every mermaid has a strawberry but in which extra strawberries are present. The different 
predictions are summarised in Table 3.  
Table 3: Predictions of Non-adult vs. Adult-Like accounts  
More condition set-up and experimental question Non-adult Adult-Like 
Context: More strawberries than mermaids in the 
experimental play space 
Give every mermaid a strawberry (Act-out task) 
Distribute all 
strawberries 
Discard 
extra 
strawberries 
Context: every mermaid has a strawberry; there are extra 
strawberries 
Does every mermaid have a strawberry? (Judgement task) 
Answer no Answer yes 
4. Results  
Due to space limitations, the results of both act-out and judgement task types are treated 
together in all three conditions (More, Equal, Less). The most interesting results will be 
presented in §4.1 (the More condition), and the subjects’ responses to the extra objects will 
be discussed. We highlight the trend in responses but do not provide statistical analysis at this 
stage. The Control conditions (Equal and Less) are reported in §4.2 and §4.3. Discussion is 
presented in §4.4. 
4.1. More  
Results are shown below for all four children in the More condition, the condition in which 
there were more objects than subjects (e.g., more strawberries than mermaids). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Subjects’ responses in More condition 
Even at a glance, it is clear that each child responds with a majority of ‘Right’ or adult-like 
answers in this condition. The children’s first correct answers in the More condition are given 
from the very earliest sessions: Ruby (1;11); Ian (2;4); Pam (2;1); Liv (2;4). Being two-year-
olds, each child responds to some trials with an ‘Other’ response – these are cases in which 
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the child was distracted or responded in a way not relevant to the trial. Only one child (Pam) 
ever responds with a ‘Wrong’ answer, and this is just one trial out of 38. Importantly, Pam 
responds correctly from her earliest timepoint (2;1); the one ‘Wrong’ response is given at 
2;11, suggesting that it be understood as a mistake rather than an indication of her 
understanding of every. 
 
Recall that in these trials, the extra objects are present, visible and controlled by the child. 
Thus, the extra objects are contextually salient. In several cases, the extra objects are made 
particularly salient when the experimenter asks about them after completion of a trial. In a 
More trial (e.g. ‘Give every mermaid a strawberry’), after providing every mermaid with a 
strawberry, there are three possible behavioural responses a child could have to the extra 
strawberries: (i) expand the subject set (look for more mermaids to give the extra 
strawberries to), (ii) distribute all strawberries to the mermaids that are present, or (iii) 
ignore/discard the extra strawberries. Only children who pass through a non-adult stage in 
their mastery of every, in which they quantify over the set in the nuclear scope of the 
universal quantifier might opt for (i). Option (ii) is possible on all accounts. Option (iii) is 
predicted by adult-like accounts, and is intuitively the most natural adult response.  
Consider the case of Ruby. Out of her total of 26 ‘Right’ More trials, she was presented 19 
times with a different unique set of extra objects (e.g., strawberries, blankets). In the 
remaining 7 trials, a judgment trial had immediately followed an act-out trial about the same 
sets of objects. Naturally, for the purpose of examining how extra objects were treated, these 
trials were not double-counted. Her extra object responses (together with responses from the 
other children) are presented in Figure 3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Subjects’ responses to extra objects in correct More cases 
 
In the vast majority of all children’s ‘Right’ More cases, they respond in an adult-like 
manner. As shown, the most common response to extra objects is to ignore them. In several 
cases (4 for Ruby, 1 for Ian, 7 for Pam, 3 for Liv) extra objects are ignored even following an 
explicit experimenter prompt. Examples from Ruby (2;4) and Pam (2;7) are given in (4)-(5). 
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(4) [Context: 5 babies, 6 blankets; Ruby gives 1 blanket to each baby, 1 extra blanket] 
 Experimenter:  Now does every baby have a blanket? Let’s look. 
 Ruby:    yeah 
Experimenter prompt: What will we do with this blanket? [indicating extra blanket] 
Ruby:    um… it’s another blanket 
 
(5) [Context: 4 babies, 6 blankets; 4 babies each under a blanket, 2 extra blankets] 
 Experimenter:  Now is every baby under a blanket? 
 Pam:    yes [nodding] 
 Experimenter prompt: What about these blankets? [indicating extra blankets] 
 Pam:    no you don’t need that blankets 
 
The children’s responses to extra objects are correctly predicted only by adult-like accounts 
of children’s understanding of ‘every’. Recall that to ignore or discard the extra objects is the 
most natural adult-like response, and a clear majority of cases were handled this way by each 
of the subjects. Sometimes, extra objects were distributed to the subjects present in the array, 
also a possible adult-like response.  
 
Only one child, Ruby, once (in 19 cases) responds in a potentially non-adult way by 
expanding the intended subject set in order to distribute all the extra objects. In this Act-out 
trial, her 14th More trial, Ruby (2;3) had 6 strawberries to distribute and after giving 
strawberries to the 4 toy characters in question, she gives one strawberry to a Kermit puppet 
sitting behind her and keeps one for herself, thus exhausting the object set. It should be noted, 
however, that she hesitates momentarily in between minimally satisfying the task (handing 
out the first 4 strawberries) and deciding to continue distributing them. It is thus not clear that 
the further distribution is actually part of the task for her. Nonetheless, to be objective, this 
was scored as an instance of ‘expand the subject set’. We stress that it was the only case 
(across all four data sets) that could possibly be interpreted in this way. Even accepting the 
scoring, Ruby’s response can still be accounted for on an adult-like model because the test 
question was actually ‘Can you give everybody a strawberry?’, and Ruby could potentially 
have defined the subject set everybody to include Kermit and herself in addition to the four 
friends. Roughly half of each child’s trials were phrased using the word everybody or 
everyone and the other half used every+N, as in every mermaid. Because the preceding 
context was designed to satisfy presuppositionality demands of every, the set being referred 
to was generally clear. Nonetheless, it could still be possible for a hearer to entertain a 
different interpretation from a speaker in this case. In light of Ruby’s otherwise consistent 
adult-like responses (and given the other children’s data), it seems likely that her single 
‘expand the subject set’ response should also be accounted for in an adult-like way.  
4.2. Equal  
The equal condition – in which there were an equal number of subjects and objects 
(mermaids and strawberries) – was included in case any child allowed only a symmetrical 
reading of ‘every’. As shown from the More condition data in Figure 2, this is not the case 
for any of the children we studied. In the Equal condition, each child gives a majority of 
‘Right’ answers from early on: Ruby (1;11); Ian (2;5), Pam (2;2), Liv (2;4). Again, only one 
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child (Ruby) gave a ‘Wrong’ answer one time. Importantly, her first correct answer was 
given at the earliest session (age 1;11). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Subjects’ responses in the Equal condition 
4.3. Less 
The Less condition (in which there were fewer objects than subjects – fewer strawberries 
than mermaids) was included as a control for tasks in the More condition. Children who 
appear to be adult-like by answering ‘yes’ to More judgement trials should answer ‘no’ to 
Less judgement trials. Before we consider the results, however, it is important to recall that in 
both task types, trials in the Less condition were the most demanding as they required the 
child either to explicitly tell the experimenter that the task could not be completed (in an Act-
out task) or answer ‘no’ to the experimental question (in a judgement task). If after 
embarking on an Act-out Less trial, a child realises that it will be impossible to complete the 
task, they may simply abandon it and turn to play with other toys. This behaviour was coded 
in our system as ‘Other’.  
 
Though it was the most difficult condition, two children (Ian & Pam) produce a majority of 
‘Right’ responses in the Less condition. For Ruby and Liv, the majority of responses are 
‘Other’. For three of the children, more ‘Right’ answers are given than ‘Wrong’ answers. 
These children also give more ‘Other’ responses than ‘Wrong’ responses. Only Ruby, the 
youngest child, gives an equal number (2) of ‘Right’ (both age 2;3) and ‘Wrong’ answers (at 
age 2;0, 2;1) in response to her 7 Less trials, while her earliest Less trial produces a mismatch 
answer (1;11), in which her first answer is non-adult, but her subsequent response 
demonstrates adult-like knowledge. Nonetheless, Ruby’s data are equivalent to the other 
three children in terms of the time-point at which ‘Right’ responses in this condition appear: 
Ruby (2;3), Ian (2;4), Pam (2;2); Liv (2;4). 
 
 
FROM THE SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE: PARAMETERS OF LANGUAGE VARIATION 13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Subjects’ responses in the Less condition 
Examples of ‘Right’ (adult-like) responses in the Less condition from Liv (2;4) and Ian (2;8) 
are given in (6) and (7).  
 
(6) [Context: 4 friends, 3 of whom have horses, Winnie the Pooh just has a pot of honey] 
Experimenter:  Does everybody have a horse? 
Liv:   no, it’s Pooh, has honey 
Experimenter:  Oh yes, well he has honey 
Liv:    yes   
 
(7) [Context: 5 babies, 4 have lettuce] 
  Experimenter:  Does every baby have some lettuce? 
  Ian:    that one haven’t got lettuce [pointing to baby with no lettuce] 
4.4. Discussion of Results 
We have shown that, overwhelmingly, two-year-old children (even one child aged 1;11) give 
adult-like answers to trials similar to that in Figure 1, trials in the More condition, when these 
trials are presented in natural contexts. Each child responded correctly to tasks in the More 
condition from the earliest time point, which indicates that children’s earliest responses to 
these tasks (responses which show adult-like understanding of every) have not been learned 
in the course of the experimental sessions. See Table 4 for a summary of the children’s first 
‘Right’ responses in each condition. 
Table 4. Subjects’ first ‘Right’ responses in each condition 
 More Equal Less 
Ruby (1;11–2;5) 1;11 1;11 2;3 
Ian   (2;4–3;1) 2;4 2;5 2;4 
Pam  (2;1–2;11) 2;1 2;2 2;2 
Liv   (2;4–3;0) 2;4 2;4 2;4 
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Moreover, the data clearly demonstrate that even when extra objects are contextually salient 
(being present, visible, controlled by the child and, in some cases, verbally queried), children 
are generally satisfied that a More trial is complete when the minimal condition for every has 
been fulfilled (every ‘subject’ has a single ‘object’). That is, two-year-olds are content to 
ignore or discard extra objects in keeping with the most intuitive adult-like analysis of such a 
situation. These results are consistent with predictions of adult-like accounts, accounts which 
attribute an adult-like reading of the universal quantifier to children from the outset.  
 
It should be noted that non-adult accounts would also permit an adult-like response in the 
More condition, if it were granted that in these cases the children were using their adult-like 
semantic model of the universal quantifier or adult-like mapping processes from syntax to 
semantics (because, even though the set of objects was arguably salient, the overall discourse 
context ensured the set of subjects was also salient). This would represent a viable 
alternative, however, only if children displayed some non-adult responses to trials in the 
More condition, either answering ‘no’ or at least showing a preference for a less typical adult 
response to extra objects (to distribute all objects to subjects present), see Table 3. Neither 
non-adult prediction fares very well with the child data presented here. As Figure 2 shows, 
only one child one time answers ‘no’ in the More condition. As shown in Figure 3, across all 
the ‘Right’ More cases, children chose to distribute all objects to subjects present relatively 
rarely, and since this option is not prohibited by adult-like accounts, these responses are not 
conclusive. Only one child chose once to expand the subject set in order to exhaust the extra 
objects, an option only predicted by the non-adult account. However, as noted before, this 
particular case could also be accounted for under the adult-like view, given that the subject 
set was referred to as everybody. Therefore, we feel that the data provide no strong evidence 
to support non-adult accounts of children’s acquisition of the universal quantifier.  
5. Conclusion 
The conclusion of this study is that children correctly quantify over the subject noun in 
sentences like ‘Every boy is riding an elephant’, as claimed by adult-like accounts. The data 
we have presented show that, from some of the earliest stages of child language 
development, children do not make non-adult responses in trials like Figure 1, our More 
condition. Instead, children quantify over the subject noun and extra members of the object 
noun set are deemed irrelevant. We feel the simplest explanation for these results is that 
children have an adult-like model of universal quantification. Indeed, this seems to be the 
emerging consensus in the field, as even Philip (2004) has recently presented evidence from 
3-5-year-old children against his non-adult Event Quantification Account (1995), and has 
revised his view in favour of an adult-like account. Our data are clearly consistent with the 
adult-like accounts. It could be argued that they are also consistent with Geurts’ Weak 
Mapping account since he proposes that children have an underlying adult-like semantic 
representation of the universal quantifier. In the absence of evidence either way, we choose 
to advocate the theory that offers the highest degree of parsimony, Full Competence, because 
it introduces only the theoretical machinery that is absolutely necessary to account for 
children’s interpretation of the universal quantifier. Until further data are obtained, we are 
left with the observation that very young children appear to assign the same meaning to every 
as adults do.  
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